Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968

Duncan Kennedy+

The topic that Diego Lopez-Medina asked me to address in this essay, prepared initially for a conference on globalization held in the three law faculties of Bogotá, Colombia, in April 2001, was, "what does critical legal studies have to contribute to peripheral countries?" My answer to the question was that although critical legal studies as a political movement has been dead for a number of years, critical legal studies as a legal academic school of thought is very much alive, and has an analysis to contribute, not to peripheral countries generically, but to the part of the intelligentsia of peripheral countries that is interested in left/modernist/post-modernist critiques of the current world system.

A year later, I revised my Bogotá lecture more or less completely for presentation of the Distinguished Visitor Lecture at Suffolk University Law School. I am grateful to the organizers of those events for pushing me into unfamiliar territory. What follows is yet a third version of a critical legal studies analysis of what I will refer to as the first two globalizations of law and legal culture, over the period 1850-1968, with an epilogue sketching a third globalization, which I will treat in greater detail in a later work. In the introductory matter, I will present all three globalizations together to give a sense of the entire thesis.

It seems only fair to warn the reader that this Article represents a work in progress. It covers a very large amount of material, both in time and in space, and I am sure I have made significant errors both of detail and of substance.

+ Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence, Harvard Law School. Thanks to Lama Abu-Odeh, Janet Halley, Karl Klare, and Ugo Mattei for helpful criticism. Terry Fisher, Morty Horwitz, Kan Mack, Yishai Blank, Máximo Langer and Alex Lorite did me the honor of public comments on earlier drafts. My thanks to the participants in the European Law Research Center's conferences on "The Social" and "Globalization of Legal Thought" for their many contributions to this project. Many students and colleagues shared their unpublished manuscripts with me, as is reflected in the footnotes below to works in progress. Lastly, I thank David Kennedy for his encouragement, his intellectual contribution to my work, and for bringing into existence over many years the cosmopolitan milieu that makes endeavors like this one possible.
The sweeping assertions in the text are supported by a minimal footnote apparatus that reflects the vagaries of my interests and reading over the years rather than sustained research on each topic covered. I hope readers will challenge rather than dismiss me for this weakness, so that I can improve the next version.

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Classical Legal Thought (CLT) globalized between 1850 and 1914. It had no essence. But among its important traits was that it was a way of thinking about law as a system of spheres of autonomy for private and public actors, with the boundaries of spheres defined by legal reasoning understood as a scientific practice. The mechanisms of globalization were direct Western imposition in the colonized world, the forced "opening" of non-Western regimes that remained independent, and the prestige of German legal science in the European and Western Hemisphere world of nation states.

Between 1900 and 1968, what globalized was The Social, again a way of thinking without an essence, but with, as an important trait, preoccupation with rethinking law as a purposive activity, as a regulatory mechanism that could and should facilitate the evolution of social life in the direction of ever greater interdependence at every level, from the family to the world of nations. The agents of globalization were reform movements of every political stripe in the developed West, nationalist movements in the periphery, and the elites of newly independent nation states after 1945.

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<td>Legal Agency</td>
<td>law professor (drafts code &amp; expounds it)</td>
<td>legal sociologist &amp; legislator &amp; administrator</td>
<td>the judge (&amp; the litigants)</td>
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<td>Economic Image</td>
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<td>labor law, administrative law, family law, international law</td>
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Between 1945 and 2000, one trend was to think about legal technique, in the aftermath of the critiques of CLT and The Social, as the pragmatic balancing of conflicting considerations in administering the system created by the social jurists. At the same time, there was a seemingly contrary trend to envisage law as the guarantor of human and property rights and of inter-governmental order through the gradual extension of the rule of law, understood as judicial supremacy. The mechanisms of globalization were American victories in World War II and the Cold War, the "opening" of nation states to the new legal consciousness through participation in the world market on the conditions set by multinational corporations and international regulatory institutions, and the prestige of American culture.

The "thing" that globalized was not, in any of the three periods, the view of law of a particular political ideology. CLT was liberal in either a conservative or a progressive way, according to how it balanced public and private in market and household. The Social could be socialist or social democratic or Catholic or Social Christian or fascist (but not communist or classical liberal). Modern legal consciousness is the common property of right-wing and left-wing rights theorists, and right-wing and left-wing policy analysts.

Nor was the thing that globalized a philosophy of law in the usual sense: in each period there was positivism and natural law within the mode of thought, various theories of rights, and, as time went on, varieties of pragmatism, all comfortably within the Big Tent. And what was globalized was most definitely not a particular body of legal rules: each mode provided materials from which jurists and legislators could produce an infinite variety of particular positive laws to govern particular situations, and they did in fact produce an infinite variety, even when they claimed to be merely transplanting rules from milieu to milieu.

The mode of thought provided a conceptual vocabulary, organizational schemes, modes of reasoning, and characteristic arguments. These were used in everything from jurists' writings for lay audiences to legal briefs, judicial opinions, treatises and doctrinal writing, to legal philosophy. Using the mode of thought, jurists in each period critiqued the previous mode, and reconceptualized, and to one degree or another substantively reformed, every area of law. We can find The Social, for example, at work everywhere from family law to civil procedure, to criminal law, to contracts, to administrative, international and constitutional law.

I will refer repeatedly to the consciousness, understood as a vocabulary of concepts and typical arguments, as a langue, or language, and to the specific, positively enacted rules of the various countries to which the langue globalized as parole, or speech. Just as a specific sentence, for example, "shut the door," is uttered in a specific language (in this case, English), a legal norm is a binding utterance in a specific legal discourse, say, that of CLT or The Social. Just as there are an infinity of grammatically correct sentences that can be uttered in
English, there are an infinity of regulatory statutes that can be formulated in the
conceptual vocabulary of The Social and defended through an infinite variety of
specific justificatory arguments formulated by combining and recombining the
policy "sound bites" of The Social.¹

The elements of the mode of thought were produced piecemeal in different civil and
common-law countries. We can distinguish two processes. First, there is that by
which a transnational mode of thought comes into existence as jurists combine ideas
with distinct origins, displacing a previous transnational mode. And second, there is
the process of geographic expansion of a transnational mode, either by the direct and
complete replacement of an earlier legal regime by a new one (as in colonial
expansion), or through the "reception" of an emergent transnational mode, which is
combined with "indigenous" elements and the residuum of the previous mode, and
molded into a new national synthesis.

As Diego Lopez-Medina argues,² we can identify locales of "production" of a new
transnational mode. There are also locales where what happens is reception, with
only minimal influence back on the transnational mode. And there are cases in
between. Germany was the hegemonic site of production between 1850 and 1900,
France between 1900 and some time in the 1930's, and the United States after 1950.

In this paper, I do not propose an overarching theory of what caused these modes of
thought to emerge when they did, of what determined their internal structural
properties, of the particulars of their geographic reception, or of their effects or
functions in social life. The scheme of periods, modes, and production/reception
across the world is a set of boxes for the organization of facts and factoids, a
structure within which to propose low-level hypotheses, and the locale of a narrative.

One can have three modest, though not negligible, ambitions for this kind of
exercise. First, one hopes that the narrative will bring together and relate to one
another a large number of previously disparate events in the intellectual history of
Western law in the world, thereby increasing the ex-post intelligibility of that
history.

Second, one small notch higher on the scale of ambition, one can hope that
other researchers (or oneself at a later date) will "confirm" the hypotheses
by finding things that uncannily correspond to what one would have predicted given
the narrative. Thus, for example, it gave me great pleasure, for reasons

¹ On "langue" and "parole," see Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Critique, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1147, 1175
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991), reprinted with a European
² Diego López-Medina, Comparative Jurisprudence: Reception and Misreading of Transnational Legal Theory in
School Library).
that will become clear, when it recently was brought to my attention that a survey of Scandinavian law published in 1963 claims, first, that Danish-Norwegian law has its origins neither in the civil nor in the common law system, and, second, that this body of law is "further influenced by social welfare trends than the law of most other societies."3

One can also hope that the narrative will operate in support of political interventions - in this case, I hope, of left or radical left interventions. It might do so because, in any given period, the plausibility, even to ourselves, of our political convictions is, to a limited but important degree, a function of how we understand our history. In this case, my hope is that the "three globalizations" narrative will support the conviction that progressive elites of the periphery can and should devise national progressive strategies, rather than accepting the prescription of the center - that they simply "open" their economies and reform their legal systems, and accept the consequences for good or ill. But to avoid false advertising, let me emphasize that the connection between narrative and political intuition is tenuous.4

Speaking for a moment of the history of Unitedstatesean law, the account that follows is heterodox in four main ways. First, it portrays the United States up to the 1930s as a context of legal reception, that is, as part of the periphery or semi-periphery. Legal development was heavily determined by what was happening in Germany and later France, but the original Unitedstatesean synthesis had no influence on those countries. I mean here to challenge the main tradition in Unitedstatesean legal history, which represents the transformations of Unitedstatesean legal thought as determined by internal social and economic developments.5

Second, this account emphasizes the extent to which developments in different fields of law followed a single pattern during the 1900-1950 period. Histories of fields constantly attribute to internal dynamics changes that were happening in strictly analogous ways in other fields, and therefore are unconvincing in the same way as national histories that disregard the transnational movement of legal thought.

Third, I depart from current fashion by treating legal realism as the critical devastation of sociological jurisprudence ("The Social," in the lingo of this article), rather than as "essentially" an extension of the sociological jurisprudences' critique of CLT.

3 DANISH AND NORWEGIAN LAW: A GENERAL SURVEY 70 (The Danish Committee on Comparative Law ed., 1963).
4 For an analogous decentering effort in the context of the process of global change, and with similar methodological premises, see P.G. Monateri, Black Gaius: A Quest for the Multicultural Origins of the "Western Legal Tradition, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 479, 481 (2000).
5 E.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977); Thomas Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITTL. REV. 1 (1983) (paying more attention to European analogies, but ironically, missing both the will theory and what was uniquely Unitedstatesean about the story, namely the extension of CLT to public law).
Fourth, in this account post-World War II developments are characterized just as much by the neo-formalist rights consciousness of the Warren Court and the neo-liberals, as by the conflicting considerations of consciousness of the Legal Process School. Further, both were responses to the demise of The Social, rather than of CLT.6

In terms of classic comparative law categories, the narrative treats the contrast between civil and common law as useful in providing explanations of how the emergent transnational mode of thought penetrated and transformed different national contexts. It rejects, however, the notion that the Western rivals evolved through time according to distinct, internally determined system logics. This is analogous to denying that we can explain any important aspect of Unitedstatesean legal thought by reference to uniquely Unitedstatesean conditions.

I. THE FIRST GLOBALIZATION

The first globalization occurred during the second half of the nineteenth century and was over by World War I. What was globalized was a mode of legal consciousness. According to social critics7 and according to most (not all) of today's historians,8 the late nineteenth century mainstream saw law as "a system," having a strong internal structural coherence based on the three traits of exhaustive elaboration of the distinction between private and public law, "individualism," and commitment to legal interpretive formalism. These traits combined in "the will theory."9 The will theory was that the private law rules of "advanced" Western nation states were best understood as rationally derived from the notion that government should protect the rights of legal persons, which meant helping them realize their wills, restrained only as necessary to permit others to do the same.

The will theory was an attempt to identify the rules that should follow from the consensus in favor of the goal of individual self-realization. It was not a political or moral philosophy justifying this goal; nor was it a positive historical or sociological theory about how this had come to be the goal. Rather, the theory offered a specific, will-based, and deductive interpretation of the interrelationship of the dozens, or hundreds, of relatively concrete norms of the

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7 E.g., Roscoe Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought II, 30 HARV. L. REV. 201, 202, 223-25 (1917); see infra notes 41-118 and accompanying text.
8 See Horwitz, supra note 6; Grey, supra note 5; Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought, 3 RES. IN LAW AND SOC. 3-24 (JAI Press 1980).
9 See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller's "Consideration and Form", 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 106-08, 115-16 (2000) [hereinafter Kennedy, From the Will Theory].
extant national legal orders, and of the legislative and adjudicative institutions that generated and applied the norms.

"Outside" or "above" legal theory, there were a variety of rationales for the legal commitment to individualism thus understood. Of these, only natural rights theory was also highly relevant on the "inside," that is, in the development of the technique of legal analysis based on deduction. Natural rights theorists had elaborated the will theory, beginning in the seventeenth century, as a set of implications from their normative premises, and their specific legal technique was the direct ancestor of the legal formalism that the socially-oriented reformers were to attack in its positivized form.\(^\text{10}\)

In the nineteenth century, the German historical school developed a positivist version of normative formalism. A national system of law reflects, as a matter of fact, the normative order of the underlying society. Such a normative order is coherent or tends toward coherence on the basis of the spirit and history of the people in question; "legal scientists" can and should elaborate the positive legal rules composing "the system" on the premise of its internal coherence.\(^\text{11}\) In the late nineteenth century, the German pandectists (Windscheid, Puchta) worked at the analysis of the basic conceptions of the German common-law version of Roman law (right, will, fault, person) with the aim of establishing that this particular system could be made internally coherent, and also could approach gaplessness. Many Continental legal scholars understood the German Civil Code of 1900 as the legislative adoption of this system.\(^\text{12}\)

The hero figure of the first globalization was the law professor (author of codes and statutory modifications of codes, as well as of treatises), and the great and inspiring precursor initiator was the founder of the historical school, Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861). The paradox of Savigny, and the probable source of his seminal importance, was the combination, in the single idea of legal science as the elaboration of "the system," of a universalizing legal formalist will theory with the idea that particular regimes of state law reflect diverse underlying non-legal societal normative orders. His approach sharply attacked the notion that all national legal regimes are simply better or worse approaches to a religiously or rationally based transnational natural law.

Outside Germany, the historical school was a minor tendency, but the same conception of a will theory combining individualism and deductive form...
gradually supplanted earlier ways of understanding private law. John Austin was a follower of the Germans, and his *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, written in 1831-32 (but not published until 1863), was the manifesto of CLT for the common-law world.\textsuperscript{13} The normative or "outside" force for the theory might come from utilitarianism, or from Lockean or Kantian or French revolutionary natural rights, or from a variant of evolutionism (the movement of the progressive societies has been from contract to status; social Darwinism). However derived, normative individualism was closely connected with logical method in the constitution of some version of the will theory.\textsuperscript{14}

The will theory in turn served a variety of purposes within legal discourse. It guided the scholarly reconceptualization, reorganization and reform of private law rules, in what the participants understood as an apolitical rationalization project. But it also provided the discursive framework for the decision of hundreds or perhaps thousands of cases, throughout the industrializing West, in which labor confronted capital, and small business confronted big business. And it provided an abstract, overarching ideological formulation of the meaning of the rule of law as an essential element in a Liberal legal order.

Left and right political projects could co-exist within CLT in its heyday because the "will theory," for all its pretensions to scientificty, was highly manipulable when it came to defining just what fell into the categories of right and will (not to speak of the ambiguities of the notion of legal personality, as applied to private corporations and labor unions). CLT firmly excluded only hierarchical organicism in the mode of monarchism or neo-feudalism (DeMaistre), and left wing collectivism in the mode of communism or utopian socialism (Fourier).

A minority current in CLT, but a major current in lay left thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, developed the two ideas that the legal order gave inadequate protection to "workers rights," and that bargains under capitalism did not represent "free will."\textsuperscript{15} For all Karl Marx's railing against it,\textsuperscript{16} the populist idea that the problem was rules skewed against the masses and in favor of "the interests" never lost its hold, and was available for appropriation by pre-1914 feminists and anti-colonialists. While progressives generally abandoned rights rhetoric during the period of *The Social*, they revived it after World War II, as we will see, in the two forms of civil libertarianism and international human rights ideology.

Nonetheless, it is fair to say that a large majority of the juristic elite that developed and propagated CLT was conservative, and that, over the course of

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item \textsuperscript{13} *John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence* (1863).
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Pound, supra note 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Karl Marx, *Critique of the Gotha Programme* (Scientific Socialism Series, Progress Publishers 1971) (1875).
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the twentieth century, the mainstream ideas of the first globalization turned from a "consciousness," within which a multitude of political projects were at least possible, into an "ideology," classical liberalism and then neoliberalism, one of the central political theoretical projects of the modern right wing (the other one being "tradition").

The mechanism of the first globalization was a combination of influence within the system of autonomous Western nation states, and imperialism broadly conceived. The German model spread not just to France 17 but also across Europe (both Western and Eastern), and to the United States and Latin America. The United States and British colonies, like Britain itself, adopted German legal science and vast numbers of statutes, while resisting codification. The former Spanish colonies were more influenced by France, and codified.

The English, French and Dutch, and later the Germans, Americans and Belgians, spread their national versions of CLT directly to their colonies, with or without codification. (The Portuguese and Spanish did the same in the remains of their empires in decline.) The Great Powers forced "opening" to Western law, as a mandatory aspect of opening to Western trade, on states not directly colonized, such as the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Thailand, Egypt, and Iran. These sometimes adopted codes on the European model and sometimes submitted to the creation of special courts to apply European law in transactions with Europeans.

A more subtle mode of globalization of CLT was implicit in the eventual universalization (that is, literally, globalization) of a single Classical system of public international law, devised by the Western Great Powers, based on the conceptual innovations of the seventeenth century natural law theorists of sovereignty as a territorial (not personal) power, absolute within its sphere. 18 In CLT, the "nation state and colonies" model was universal except for anachronisms, and the heterogeneous mish mash of governance structures of the world in 1800 was no more than a memory.

Finally, there was the creation of a first global system of international economic law, based on free trade, the gold standard, and private international law (often applied by arbitrators) to settle disputes. Money was depoliticized, 19 and an international capital market, with accompanying gunboat diplomacy,

came into existence. Within this complex (and fragile, and violent) structure, the combination of the growth of world trade and the infrastructural and primary product investments of the center in the periphery unleashed a process of social transformation, irreversible as it has turned out, out of which emerged (only in the second half of the nineteenth century) the "tradition/modernity" dichotomy that still rules our lives.  

The historicist idea (Savigny), as I remarked above, was double, if not contradictory. The law of a nation was a reflection of the spirit or culture of its people, and in this sense inherently political, but could be developed in a scientific manner by jurists who presupposed its internal coherence. In Germany, according to Savigny, the people had received Roman law, and Christianized and modernized it through evolutionary popular action. This particular law revealed itself, when worked over by the science of the jurists, to be based on the highly abstract ideas of right and will. Moreover, it corresponded in its fundamentals to the *ius gentium*, or law of peoples, the minimal substratum of legal rules that were shared, as a matter of fact, or at least should be shared, by all peoples. This formulation "fit" globalization in the mode described in the last four paragraphs.  

Of course, when what happened was direct colonization, there was, initially, little effective resistance to whatever legal ideas the colonizer chose to impose. In Western and Eastern Europe, and North and South America, however, CLT had to win over the elites of independent nation states. In the territories of the Ottoman Empire and in Southeast and East Asia, what was happening was "opening", not direct conquest. In the Ottoman lands and across Asia, there were highly developed pre-existing modes of legal consciousness (Islamic, Hindu, Confucian, Shinto) that had at least a chance of resisting or transforming themselves into local competitors. For example, the *Majalla*, the Ottoman codification of the Islamic Hanafi law of obligations, 1869-76, was a serious peripheral attempt to adapt the European legal form of codification (not without earlier Ottoman analogues) to Islamic substance. Something at least resembling "selection," along with "imposition," was probably a factor, in these complex contexts, in the success of CLT. In other words, CLT probably had some intrinsic appeal to the elites that adopted it.

CLT replaced an earlier Western transnational mode of thought that had asserted the existence of a universal law of reason, either Catholic or based on natural rights theory, and a sharp legal distinction between civilized (participant in the *ius gentium*) and barbarous nations. CLT offered the legal elites of the

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21 Savigny, The System of Modern Roman Law, supra note 11.
23 See Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs and Steel (1997).
peripheral, newly formed nation states of Europe, North and South America, and Asia something at least superficially more attractive. The national elites could identify themselves with their respective "peoples," and sharply dissociate, if they were English or Russian, or for that matter Argentinean, or Egyptian, or Japanese, from the Germans and French.

The legal elites of newly formed nation states could deploy European historicist legal theory to defend themselves against European legal hegemony - only Latin American jurists could "own" a Latin American law reflecting criollo consciousness;²⁴ Japanese law should reflect the "spirit" of the Japanese people. Their mission was the development of that law in particular, not universal or natural law, and its development in a world of formally equal nation states, rather than in the outer darkness of "barbarism."²⁵

On the other side of the contradictory structure, CLT affirmed that every country with a Western legal heritage shared the Roman legacy along with Savigny's Germans, including, for example, the newly independent Bulgarians (1878/1908) and the Bolivians (1825), and that every nation that participated in the global order of commerce and finance participated in the ius gentium. Along with the particularist notion that every people had its own unique normative order, the jurists scattered across the periphery of independent nations and modernizing empires could affirm their participation in the developing sciences of legal obligation and international law, based as they were on an analytics of will, right and sovereignty that had no obvious national particularity at all.

They could develop their own slightly modified national versions of the Civil and Commercial Codes of the commercially, financially and militarily dominant European powers, facilitating integration into the world market, without seeing themselves as traitors to their national constituencies. And they could work, as jurists, for their nations' interests within the structure of international law, deploying the norms of sovereign equality and autonomy against the Great Powers. At home, the universal, transnational element in CLT was the basis of a claim to power as mediators of the participation of the periphery in the normative order, as well as the culture, of the metropoles.²⁶

There are no fewer than three other structural characteristics of CLT that may have facilitated its reception, first across Europe and then across the non-European periphery. These are: (1) the distinction between the "subjects" of municipal law and international law; (2) the distinction between public and private law; and (3) the distinction between the law of the market and the law of the household.

The "subjects" of municipal law include "persons," but the "subjects" of international law were, in CLT, only "sovereigns." Citizens as citizens had no rights at all under international law. If they had no rights under international law, then sovereigns, and in particular powerful sovereigns, had no legal basis for interfering with the way independent states treated their citizens. This was the globalization of a legal consciousness within which a basic structural trait was that jurisdiction must not be global. The people doing the receiving were legal elites scattered around the world. They were closely integrated with, but not everywhere identical to, the political and economic elites of their respective countries. Receiving CLT permitted a gesture of striking cosmopolitanism, without any sacrifice of local autonomy (in the sense of legal autonomy vis-à-vis other countries).

In CLT, everyone understood (and jurists often explicitly affirmed) that private law was the core of law. That distinguished not only international law, but public law as well, as not part of the core. Public law was the law of the state: criminal law, administrative law (law of the bureaucracy - every state has one), and constitutional law. Public law differed from private law because it was less scientific and more political than private law. It was more political because criminal law directly reflected the normative order of the common people; administrative law was the law of the sovereign, whose legal autonomy was, arguably, inherently unlimited; and constitutional law was created by the people, or by the constituent orders of civil society, in their capacity as ultimate legal authors.

International law had only sovereigns as subjects, so the jurist could not be called on to denounce, in the name of international law, the conduct of his sovereign toward his fellow citizens. Indeed the jurist had to resist the illegal efforts of other sovereigns to interfere. Public law was political rather than scientific, with the same result: science did not oblige the jurist one way or another on the issue of local dictatorship or oligarchic rule by large landowners. At the same time, public law was still "Law", and so the jurist could, if he wanted to risk it, try to parlay Law's prestige in favor of one outcome or another at the moment of coup d'état, and the jurist should certainly be in charge of drafting when the new regime required a new constitution.

CLT dealt with the issue of patriarchy, meaning not just "gender" but the whole "household," through the distinction, within private law, between the law of obligations and family law. The first globalization globalized a compromise in which the will theory came to an end at the family. There was a big difference between liberalism in the economy and liberalism with respect to the relations of seducers and virgins, husbands and wives, fathers and abused or rebellious daughters, husbands and mistresses, ex-husbands, ex-wives and their

27 E.g., SAVIGNY, THE SYSTEM OF MODERN ROMAN LAW, supra note 11.
children, rich patriarchs and their proletarian boy lovers, and so on.

The starting point was the "early modern" system of family law. As Blackstone described it,28 the patriarch was legally obliged to support his wife and minor children, entitled to their obedience which he could enforce through moderate physical punishment, had arbitrary power with respect to many aspects of their welfare and property, and was protected against sexual and economic interference by third parties.

This was a limited, Christianized, supervised form of patriarchy, nothing like the Roman patria potestas. The father was understood to be subject to "natural" obligations to family members, obligations of care and protection that went well beyond those owed one another by market actors. These were legally enforceable against the patriarch in court, if he went beyond the bounds of culturally sanctioned physical abuse or denial of necessaries, for example, but only at the outer limits of outrage. Fathers legally owed less to family than to strangers except that in exceptional cases they owed more. Within the wide range of discretion thus granted him by positive law, jurists presented his high altruistic obligations as moral or ethical rather than properly legal (therefore described as of "imperfect obligation," by contrast with obligations "perfected" by the addition of state enforcement mechanisms).

The regimes in place in the North Atlantic when CLT began to take off around 1850 also included some or all of the following: divorce for fault or not at all, inheritance rules designed to preserve legitimate family assets, criminal prohibition of "unnatural" and "dishonorable" sexuality, including same sex intercourse and female adultery (male adultery was usually punished only if there was also cohabitation or concubinage), snuffing of legal claims arising out of "immoral" relationships (particularly the claims of mistresses and illegitimate children), and child custody in the father. Within these broad initial contours, family law moved toward liberalization at different speeds in different countries, with different political and religious balances of power producing diverse and unstable bodies of positive law.

The Code Napoleon (1804), for example, was liberal in that it permitted divorce by mutual consent. That provision was abrogated in 1815 (at the Restoration), and not restored until 1975. The Chilean Bello Code of 1857 adapted much of the liberal law of obligations of the French Code, but remitted the whole of the law of marriage and divorce to the Catholic Church for administration under canon law. The Bello Code in some cases adopted, and in others rejected, liberal rules designed to impede the formation of stable dynastic families (for example, forbidding entails, increasing the rights illegitimate children, reducing forced shares in inheritance), according to the balance of local forces.29

28 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES #421-47.
In 1850, the family law of the North Atlantic countries still looked, at the formal level, quite similar to the then existing regimes of Muslim or Hindu or Chinese family law. In some cases, for example the Muslim law of marriage, which recognized the wife's separate property and treated domestic violence and the husband's duty of support as fully justiciable, the West was well "behind" the East.\(^{30}\) North Atlantic family law was only somewhat more liberal than the traditionalist Catholic regime that Spain had imposed on its American colonies.\(^{31}\) In North and South America, Eastern Europe, and the Ottoman lands, exactly as in Western Europe, local elites did battle as to how far the reforms of the middle of the nineteenth century should go in a liberalizing direction.

The substance of the North Atlantic regime changed rapidly, by historical standards, at the same time that it was re-conceptualized by the Classical jurists. Legally legitimized hierarchy gave way, step-by-step, sometimes with steps backward, to a regime of formal equality. For family relations, it was formal equality within what the Classics defined as a "status" rather than a contract, so that it was the "will of the state" rather than that of the parties that fixed the relations of the parties. In this way, CLT sharply split family law from the law of obligations (contract, property, and tort), placing it on the side of morals and politics, rather than science and will.\(^{32}\)

It was equally if not more important that CLT combined movement toward formal equality with a powerful doctrine of legal non-intervention in the family that rendered many of the formally equal rights of wives unenforceable (for example, domestic violence, marital rape).\(^{33}\) CLT rationalized non-intervention on the ground that the "sphere" of the family, based on the principle of egalitarian altruism, would be corrupted or destroyed by judicial intervention and the use of legal tools closely associated with the conflicting individualist ethos of market law.\(^{34}\)

The colonial powers everywhere declined to replace "native" family law with their own systems. Even the French, famous for "direct rule" and "assimilation", did no more than promote the codification of Muslim family law in the Maghreb. The British did the same in India, with separate Hindu, Muslim and Christian rules. In the Netherlands Indies, the Dutch preserved adat law for the family. But everywhere the process of formalization within

\(^{30}\) Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt (unpublished paper on file with author).


\(^{32}\) MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH (1985).


the colonial legal and political system included some deliberate change (for example, with respect to practices like widow burning in India), and initiated many indirect intended and unintended changes. These might reinforce, rather than weaken, the powers of heads of households by reducing responsibilities of titular landholders to extended family members.

There seem to have been a very large number of solutions, along a highly predictable continuum of options, with the outcome in many countries determined through sharp conflicts between the Catholic Church, socially conservative Protestant sects or Muslim clerics, on one side, and "modernizing" secular forces on the other. Though the continuum of solutions and the arguments back and forth seem to have been the same everywhere, the solutions adopted in North America were much more "liberal" than those in South America and the ex-Ottoman Empire. In Europe there were as many compromises as there were countries, and they were everywhere unstable, with change generally in the liberalizing direction interrupted by periods of reaction.

Applying to the family the analysis proposed above of the appeal of historicism and the municipal/international and public/private distinctions, it seems plausible that the distinction between market law and family law functioned in the same way. CLT did not claim substantive universality - quite the contrary. Beginning with Savigny, it offered peripheral elites the categorization of their family law as popular, political, religious, cultural and particular, and therefore as eminently national. In exchange, they accepted (usually with alacrity) that the law of the market would be, not positively and in every detail, but generally and "essentially," the property and contract-based law of a national "free" market, linked to other free markets by free trade, the gold standard, and a private international law that was conceptually identical to municipal civil law.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the major boundary issue that had to be resolved before the consciousness of the first globalization could gel had nothing to do with the blood family. For the family, the solution according to which full liberalization did not apply, and every country could have its own compromise between equality and tradition, produced a stable overarching context for local battles. The more difficult question was the status of what the eighteenth century had conceived as domestic labor, the labor of slaves, apprentices, indentured servants, and dependent agricultural laborers.

36 See id.
38 See, e.g., Jaramillo, supra note 31.
In the North Atlantic, the ultimate resolution came about through the emergence of the factory, the small farm, and the bourgeois (as opposed to aristocratic) institution of domestic service as the dominant labor forms. All of these classes of labor were categorized, within the liberal CLT regime of will theory and free contract, through the notion of "self-ownership," rather than within the eighteenth century model of the servant as part of the household. Duties of obedience were eliminated along with rights to support; the arbitrary authority of the employer replaced the arbitrary authority of the patriarch.

The intermediate forms of semi-free labor (serfdom, apprenticeship, the indenture) disappeared - through the French Revolution and Napoleon's conquests in Western Europe, at the moment of independence from Spain in Latin America, after the middle of the century in Russia. Slavery flourished in many countries of the Americas over the nineteenth century, and was not abolished in the United States until 1863, Brazil in 1871, and, finally, Cuba in 1886. At this point, all that was left of the legal household was the family.40

Incorporation of these labor forms through CLT's categories - the sale of labor power for the agricultural laborer, private property in land for the peasant - meant that the colonial powers and the independent states of the periphery sometimes simply ratified, by adopting a formal, abstract idea of free will rather than a more substantive one, whatever schemes of economic and social hierarchy emerged out of the play of violence and culture on the ground.

And sometimes they transformed, in their own interests, but without understanding exactly what they were doing, the pre-existing social

arrangements by forcing them into the mold of the "Western idea of property."42 Through the long transition, a whole series of legal dodges were available so that something like serfdom could be maintained within liberal forms, and something like capitalism maintained within feudal forms (the great exception is British India, where land reform was a major strategy of control and colonial reconstitution from the middle of the nineteenth century).43

Once again, it seems plausible that CLT could globalize precisely because it had so little to say one way or the other about the legal treatment of the legally free but obviously subordinated peasants and agricultural laborers of the South.

As we will see, it is no more possible to understand the second and third globalizations than the first without an analysis of how the liberal idea (of a regime based on state action to guarantee the exercise of free will and also the limits on free will necessary for everyone to enjoy it) worked in symbiosis with or in contradiction of the counter-ideal, counter-ethnic, counter-reality represented by the household.

II. THE SECOND GLOBALIZATION

The second globalization began around 1900 and had spent its force by the end of World War II, but it strongly influenced thinking about both the international and third-world economic development strategies through the 1960s. What was globalized this time was a critique of the first globalization and a reconstruction project. The critique was that the late nineteenth century European mainstream abused deduction in legal method and was "individualist" in legal substance. The slogan of the second globalization was "The Social," an abstraction that played much the same role during this period that will, right, and fault played in CLT.

A. The Social as a Transnational Legal Consciousness

The initial innovators of The Social were German-speaking, including Jhering,44 Gierke,45 and Ehrlich,46 but the main globalizers were French-

43 Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (1959); Robert Eric Frykenberg, Land Control and Social Structure in Indian History (2d ed. 1979).
44 Rudolf von Jhering, Law as a Means to an End (Isaac Husik trans., Macmillan 1924) (1914).
45 Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Frederic William Maitland trans., 1913).
speaking, Saleilles, Gény, Duguit, Lambert, Josserand, Gounod, and Gurvitch. Like the Marxists (the other significant early twentieth century school critical of CLT), they interpreted the actual regime of the will theory as an epiphenomenon in relation to a "base" - in the case of the Marxists, the capitalist economy and in the case of The Social, "society" conceived as an organism. The idea of both was that the will theory in some sense "suits" the socio-economic conditions of the first half of the nineteenth century. But The Social people were anti-Marxist, just as much as they were anti-laissez faire. Their goal was to save liberalism from itself.

Their basic idea was that the conditions of late nineteenth century life represented a social transformation, consisting of urbanization, industrialization, organizational society, globalization of markets, all summarized in the idea of interdependence. Because the will theory was individualist, it ignored interdependence, and endorsed particular legal rules that permitted anti-social behavior of many kinds. The crises of the modern factory (industrial accidents, pauperization) and the urban slum, and later the crisis of the financial markets and the Great Depression, all derived from the failure of coherently individualist law to respond to the coherently social needs of modern conditions of interdependence. After 1919, they extended this analysis to the problem of war, understood as the product of failures of an international order based on the logic of sovereignty, highly analogous to the

48 Raymond Saleilles, De la Déclaration de la Volonté (1901).
50 LEON DUGUIT, THEORY OF OBJECTIVE LAW ANTERIOR TO THE STATE, IN MODERN FRENCH LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (VII. The Modern Legal Philosophy Series 1916).
51 Edouard Lambert, La Fonction du Droit Civile Comparé (1903).
53 Emmanuell Gounod, Le Principe de l'autonomie de la Volonté (1912).
54 Georges Gurvitch, L’idée du Droit Social (1932).
problems of markets based on the logic of property.57

From this "is" analysis, they derived the "ought" of a reform program, one that was astonishingly successful. There was labor legislation, the regulation of urban areas through landlord/tenant, sanitary and zoning regimes, the regulation of financial markets, and the development of new institutions of international law. The is-to-ought move appealed to a very wide range of legitimating rhetorics. These traversed the left/right spectrum, leaving out only Marxist collectivism at one extreme and pure Manchesterism at the other.

The Social, then, could be based on socialist or social democratic ideology (perhaps Durkheimian), on the social Christianity of Protestant sects, on neo-Kantian "situational natural law," on Comtean positivism, on Catholic natural law, on Bismark/Disraeli social conservatism, or on fascist ideology.58 In other words, The Social, like CLT, was initially a consciousness (though always in an embattled relationship with CLT, rather than straightforwardly hegemonic in the way CLT had been in the brief period between about 1850 and 1890) within which it was possible to develop different and conflicting ideological projects. Regardless of which it was, the slogans included organicism, purpose, function, reproduction, welfare, instrumentalism (law is a means to an end) - and so anti-deduction, because a legal rule is just a means to accomplishment of social purposes.

A crucial part of the social critique of CLT was the claim that it maintained an appearance of objectivity in legal interpretation only through the abuse of deduction. According to The Social people, CLT people understood themselves to operate as interpreters (judges, administrators, law professors) according to a system of induction and deduction premised on the coherence, or internal logical consistency, of the system of enacted legal norms. One mode was to locate the applicable enacted rule; a second was to develop a rule to fill a gap by a chain of deductions from a more abstract enacted rule or principle; a third, the method of "constructions," was to determine what un-enacted principle must be part of "the system," given the various enacted elements in it, if we were to regard it as internally coherent, and then derive a gap filling rule from the construction.

In the social analysis, because interpreters within CLT had always to understand themselves as logically compelled in one of these ways, they could never legitimately work consciously to adapt the law to the new conditions of the late nineteenth century. Nonetheless those conditions constantly presented them, as interpreters, with gaps. What the CLT people had to do, to stay loyal to their role as they conceived it, was to "abuse deduction."59 They had to

57 ALEJANDRO ALVAREZ, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW (1924).
58 See DeBuen, supra note 55.
59 On the role of "abuse of deduction," see Kennedy, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 1; Kennedy, From the Will Theory, supra note 9; Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formalism, in 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 8634 (2001); Kennedy & Belleau, supra note 55; see also Esquirol, supra note 26.
make decisions reached on other grounds look like the operation of deductive work premised on the coherence of the system. And the abuse of deduction permitted the smuggling in not of the general desiderata of social evolution, but of the partisan ideologies of the parties to the conflicts between labor and capital, large and small business, of the century's end (important antiformalists, aside from the social people, were Demogue, Heck, Holmes, Hohfeld, Llewellyn). The Social people had four positive proposals: (1) from the social "is" to the adaptive "ought" for law, (2) from the deductive to the instrumental approach to the formulation of norms, (3) not only by the legislature but also by legal scientists and judges and administrative agencies openly acknowledging gaps in the formally valid order, (4) anchored in the normative practices ("living law") that groups intermediate between the state and the individual were continuously developing in response to the needs of the new interdependent social formation.

B. From "Is" to "Ought"

1. Pluralism

Many advocates of The Social argued that various groups within the emerging interdependent society, including, for example, merchant communities and labor unions, were developing new norms to fit the new "social needs." These norms, regarded as "valid" "living law," rather than deduction from individualist postulates, should, and also would, in this "legal pluralist" view, be the basis for legislative, administrative, and judicial elaboration of new rules of state law. The pluralist position, like so much in The Social, was a complex is/ought mixture.

Pluralists identified the multiple sub-state and supra-state normative orders in actual operation in the modern world, and the various kinds of institutionalized or informal sanctioning systems that contributed to their effectiveness in influencing behavior. In this mode, the Mafia code of _omerta_ and Canon Law were as important and interesting as any other non-state order.

60 René Demogue, _Fundamental Notions of Private Law_, in _Modern French Legal Philosophy_, supra note 50.
62 Oliver Wendell Holmes, _Privilege, Malice and Intent_, in _Collected Legal Papers_ (1920); Holmes, _The Path of the Law_, in _Collected Legal Papers_, supra; Holmes, _Natural Law_, in _Collected Legal Papers_, supra.
63 Wesley Hohfeld, _Fundamental Conceptions in Legal Reasoning_, 26 Yale L.J. 710 (1917).
64 E.g., Karl Llewellyn, _On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence_, 40 Colum. L. Rev. 581 (1940).
But in their normative role, the pluralists were much more interested in medieval corporations, the law of merchants, the law of the industrial shop, and customary international law. My hypothesis is that this was because in each of these, it was possible to argue that non-state law was more "social" than state law, and provided a basis for reform of the latter in the particular direction they favored.65

2. Institutionalism

This was the view that in order to understand non-state orders, within the pluralist enterprise broadly conceived, it was necessary to do two things: identify the social practices distinguishing non-state law from mere customs or mores, and explain how to conceptualize the coherence of non-state law, that is, how we know that a given specific norm is part of a system of non-state law. The notion of the institution served both of these purposes: the reference was to an organization, a set of roles, persistent in time but with shifting personnel, oriented in a founding moment to some set of (changeable) purposes going beyond the individual interests of the role incumbents. A purely for profit private corporation is an institution if it has, as all do, an explicit or implicit business plan (the State becomes an institution among many, in this mode of analysis).

We observe that as a matter of fact institutions develop complex normative orders, enforced by a wide variety of sanctions, from formal "staff" (Weber) to popular assemblies to mere social pressure. The institutionalist idea was that the norms derived both their rational coherence and their "validity" from the combination of the devotion of the institution to a purpose or purposes and its history of development in response to changing circumstances. The is/ought move was to say that institutions should define and develop norms in ways that furthered their purposes. And the state, as an institution with the purpose of coordinating normative orders, should recognize and facilitate, rather than ignore or oppose, this process of internal institutional development.66

3. Corporatism

This was the view that the plural institutions all had purposes that contributed to the self-preservation or reproduction and evolution of society as a whole, and that taken together they were a better "representative" of society

65 See Ehrlich, supra note 46; Santi Romano, L’ORDINAMENTO GIURIDICO (1918); Gurvitch, supra note 54. For a listing of the most important pluralists up to the 1930’s, see Gurvitch, supra. See also John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1986); B. DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW COMMON SENSE: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995); and the excellent review article, Brian Tamanaha, A Non-essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J. LAW & SOC. 296 (2000), for a sampling of modern pluralism.

than, say, an electoral process based on voting by individuals. Moreover, a legislative process that emerged from individual voting was unlikely to perform, in a rational way, the function of overseeing the self-regulating activities of institutions.

In the corporatist view, it would be better to give the institutions one mode or another of direct access to state power, rather than constituting the state either in opposition to or without relation to them. The fascist regimes of the 1930s embraced corporatism along with presidentialism as an alternative to parliamentary democracy. They so thoroughly discredited it in the process that it is hard to remember that, in the form of industry labor/management councils with power to make legally binding regulations, it was the central element of Roosevelt's First New Deal.67

4. Social Legislation

One way to understand The Social is as a transformation of the CLT model, whereby individuals constituted a people, with rights secured by a state (that is, a sovereign) in decentralized association with other sovereign states, representing and securing the rights of other peoples. In The Social, there was an intense focus not just on the plurality of institutions below and above the level of the state, but also on groups between the level of the individual and the people. The most important of these were social classes, and particularly labor and capital, and national minorities, understood on the new model of the ethnic group, a diffuse combination of racial, religious, cultural and historical particularity.

Whereas Marxism was a "conflict ideology," prophesying the triumph of the working class in death struggle with the capitalist class, The Social was a "harmony ideology," preaching a function for each organized interest, and the existence of a "public interest" in the coordination of their interdependent activities in order to maximize social welfare.68 So The Social people were against the tendency of CLT to deny the juristic reality of anything other than an individual or a state.

In labor law, the goal was to devise new legal forms, such as social insurance against industrial accidents as a compulsory element of the wage bargain, the labor union as an involuntary association, and compulsory collective bargaining, all in the context of pervasive regulation from above. The notion was that given the interdependence of labor and capital, and the interdependence of all the different sectors of a modern economy, "industrial warfare" (or "strife," or "class war") threatened the whole society with

68 See REXFORD TUGWELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF PUBLIC INTEREST (1922).
breakdowns of production that might be truly catastrophic. In this situation, the "public interest" was in "industrial peace," and the public interest justified jettisoning individualist and formalist notions, such as that it would violate basic premises if a union's collectively bargained agreement could determine the terms of employment for a worker who was not a member.69

In CLT, as we saw, plurality was an essential part of the picture, but it was, first of all, the plurality of right-bearing individuals. Second, there was the plurality of volksgeists - the plurality of family law regimes corresponding to different national cultures, the plurality of public law arrangements corresponding to the different modes of political life of different peoples. These pluralities were peripheral in relation to the legal core, which consisted of the private law of obligations, with contract law, the law of free will from the starting point of property rights, as the core of the core.

Social legislation meant expanding the regulatory functions of the state, carving out and redefining as public law vast areas that had fallen safely within the domain of right, will, and fault. Social law coordinated the various individual willing subjects of CLT in the public interest, through public agencies that were to make rules to instantiate relatively abstract and vague legislative pronouncements (for example, in the United States context, a federal statute banning "contracts in restraint of trade," "unfair competition," "unfair labor practices," or "deceptive practices" in securities law).

5. Expertise and "Studies"

The agencies were supposed to bring "expertise" to bear, meaning both social science and concrete pragmatic knowledge. They were to act through inspectorates applying low-level criminal sanctions or injunctions, in proceedings much less formal than those emblematic of CLT. In place of the law of obligations, the salient fields were administrative law, applicable to all social legislation, and then labor law, family law, and international law.70 By the 1930s, The Social people had flipped the structure of CLT and the periphery had become the core.

After a brief flirtation with the judge (both in France and in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century), the hero figures of The Social current became, in principal, the legislators who drafted the multiplicity of special laws that constituted the new order, along with the administrator who produced and enforced the detailed regulations that put legislative regimes into effect. The literature of The Social, however, was the product of a new breed of law professors. These were not the magisterial authors of codes and expounders of their inner logic. They were law reformers, writing theory, doing studies,

70 See JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
drafting legislation, overseeing, in doctrinal literature, its implementation and eventual amendment in the light of practical experience.

Because of the diverse political currents that supported reform, the professors of The Social were not pigeon-holed politically. Nor were they open to the charge that they rejected scientific objectivity. The Social was social scientific. The legal science of CLT was the science of legal categories. It was the science of the technique of law. The Social was associated with sociology, economics and psychology.

A key element of is-to-ought was the "study," beginning with industrial accidents at the beginning of the century. The premise of the "study" was that there was a politically powerful, centrist, middle class audience that tended to assume that things in general were going fine. When alerted by a study either to dangers to themselves (for example, unsanitary food processing) or to sufficiently flagrant abuse of others (conditions in the mines), this group would support a regulatory regime on "public interest" rather than partisan political grounds.

The Social and its studies were scientific in the way characteristic of the social science of that period, which was a mish mash of evolutionism, pragmatism in the Dewey tradition, and diverse forms of positivism, such as statistics-based empirical surveying. When the social jurist squared off against his Classical legal positivist colleague, treating him as a formalist dinosaur, hopelessly rigid and out of contact with reality, he did not do it in the name of subjectivism or whatever his political preferences might be. He did it in the name of his own discipline, because The Social was a discipline, not just a political position.

The combination of pluralism, institutionalism, and commitment to empirical investigation in the is-to-ought context meant that the "other" of law was no longer morality, as it had been in CLT, but "society." Law did or did not adapt to it, did or did not constitute while pretending to merely mirror it; society did or did not have powerful long run immanent tendencies relevant to law-making, etc.

6. Innovation Across the Whole Juristic Field

One juristic response to social legislation was to assimilate it to the Classical positivist model by adding new legal topics corresponding to new statutes, without modifying the premises or the methods of doctrinal analysis in any way. The advent of The Social added norms and provided new fields for legal science. In every country that has a Western system of legal education, it seems that some part of instruction proceeds in this way, with classical fields coherent in a classical way, and social fields coherent in a social way.

The social jurists themselves were more ambitious. Their notion was that the reform effort to make law adapt to society required a thorough revamping
of the juristic universe. In civil procedure, for example, the adversary system was obviously mal-adapted to a modern, interdependent, flexible, complex industrial system. We needed many new types of procedures that would get us out of the typical individualist battle model. 71 In criminal law, we needed to individualize punishment but also to make it socially effective by identifying the types of criminals and the social causes of crime. 72 Even contract law, the core of the core, needed revision, in the direction, for example, of precontractual duties, liberalization of excuses, functional rather than formalist interpretation of formalities. 73

We needed new types of courts - labor courts, merchant courts, juvenile courts and family courts, as well as new types of procedure. Commercial law needed to be reformed to meet the requirements of the new style of enterprise, particularly the fact that most transactions were between very large companies, or between large enterprises and individual actors with no bargaining power at all. Corporate law needed to be revamped because of the radical separation of ownership and control. 74

It was not just a matter of reconceptualizing and then reforming the maladaptive, ideologically individualist doctrinal substance that had emerged in the late nineteenth century. The anti-formalist strand in The Social current emphasized gaps, conflicts and ambiguities in the corpus of positive law, and consequently the role of the judge, either as an abuser of deduction or as a rational law maker. In the United States, stare decisis was discredited as abuse of deduction par excellence, and layers of socially-oriented early case law were discovered in order to multiply conflicts and open the space for reform.

The civilian dispute about what counted as a "source of law" was resolved in favor of the legitimacy of jurisprudence (judge-made law), whatever the "official portrait" might continue to be. 75 Moreover, all law interpreters, in the social vision, including professors and administrators, and lawyers when they draft contracts, lawyers when they choose litigation and settlement strategies, lawyers when they give advice on liability, are engaged in law-making. What the enterprise does will be affected at every stage by interpretations made by the lawyers, and those interpretations will be contestable.

They will be contestable because, given gaps, there will often be a plausible social interpretation and an individualist or formalist or positivist interpretation of the relevant valid norms. The Social could be snuffed out by judicial

73 See Kennedy, From the Will Theory, supra note 9.
hostility - labor courts or family courts required judges who did not hate the whole idea of new juridical institutions. If they did, they would find means of sabotage or just bungle things. Only if judges, administrators and lawyers understood not just the rationale but also the technique of reform would reform work.

That produced new ideas about the law school curriculum. The person teaching a course on the new labor law statute should know some sociology, economics, and psychology, and it would be a good idea to have a small number of docile economists, sociologists and psychologists on the faculty. Ones who would never claim to know anything about law, but would be a useful resource for us in developing our interdisciplinary projects. Interdisciplinarity for The Social meant the law professor as a generalist whose skills allowed acquisition of all other disciplines without formal training.  

As I have already said, this was not about politics. It might be true that their version of social justice could be characterized politically as more corporatist, communitarian, anti-formalist, and pluralist than the thought of their enemies in the liberal traditions of the center and right. But they did not think that the mere commitment to social justice in the is-to-ought mode of The Social put them in danger of eroding the distinction between law and politics.

The social jurists generally conceded the internal coherence of individualist deductive law (emphasizing gaps, not inescapable contradictions); they claimed the same kind of coherence for social law. The latter claim was strongly contested. Those we might broadly denominate liberals stuck to the apparatus and aspirations of CLT, while being willing to modernize, say by reading the concepts of *ordre publique* and "good faith" very broadly. But they understood The Social to be chaotic, without a single counter-principle to oppose to right and will. Moreover, while they recognized that The Social had many different forms of politics, from left to right, they saw this as a symptom of the tragic politicization of law that followed the premature renunciation of legal science for social science, rather than as evidence of the supra-political truth of The Social.  

**C. The Global Reception of The Social**

The second globalization followed the channels established by the first. Students from all over Europe went to France and Germany to study law. From the middle of the nineteenth century up to the 1930's, students from the part of the rest of the world under Western influence flocked to Europe. From

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the colonies, they went to their respective "metropoles," the Senegalese to Paris, the Indonesians to Amsterdam, and so forth. If they had a choice, they went to the European capital with the most prestige in their part of the periphery (Latin Americans to Paris, Unitedstateseans to Germany).

First Germany and later France were the fountains of The Social, but it developed simultaneously in many places, even though most of those places imported elements from Germany and France and had relatively little or no influence back.79 In Italy it was first moderately left, and then fascist.80 In Spain (Franco), Portugal (Salazar) and Greece (Metaxas), it was fascist; in the Netherlands81 and Britain (Fabian),82 moderately left. The Unitedstatesean sociological jurisprudes (Pound,83 Cardozo,84 and Brandeis85 were the most important) developed a version that was first moderately left and then moderately right. They drew extensively on the French and Germans, but were also strongly influenced by Holmes, who developed, before Gény, a peculiarly American variant of the "abuse of deduction" thesis.86

1. The Social and Nationalism

As The Social established itself in the West, students from Eastern Europe, Latin America, South, East and Southeast Asia, the Arab world, and Africa appropriated it and took it home. A crucial dimension of the spread of The Social was nationalism, but in at least three modes, rather than as a unitary phenomenon. First, nationalism, as irredentism and as the drive for ethnic purity, was understood by the progressive European social people to be, along with class conflict, the scourge that might well destroy European civilization.

Theorists of The Social undertook a deep rethinking of public international law in an effort to contain and shape nationalism understood as a life creating and also life destroying irrational force. In public international law, the mandate system, the move to institutions (the League of Nations), the creation of bricolage type governing institutions such as the free city of Danzig, and the

79 See Gény, Appendix, in Method of Interpretation, supra note 49 (providing an egocentric summary of developments up to 1919).
82 Harold Laski, The State in the New Social Order (1921).
84 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
85 For a typical early example of The Social, see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). Also see Brandeis' famous brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld protective labor legislation for women on conservative social grounds. Id. at 419 (presenting abstract of "the Brandeis brief").
86 Holmes, supra note 62; Kennedy & Belleau, supra note 55.
interwar regimes of minority protection all involved innovative forms, and the self-conscious rejection of the "logic of sovereignty." They were inspired by, and in turn inspired, the innovations in labor law described above ("industrial warfare" contained in ways analogous to "real" warfare; flaws of the logic of property parallel the flaws of the logic of sovereignty).88

At the very same time, The Social was one of the key slogans of nationalism itself, in its fascist form, but also in authoritarian right wing variants in many parts of the world, including the new states carved out of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and Latin American countries such as Argentina (Perón) and Brazil (Vargas). This meant that, during the interwar period, progressive or revolutionary left wing reformers in countries like Colombia and Mexico, and their right wing enemies, employed virtually identical social, corporatist, anti-capitalist, anti-liberal rhetorics. The Mexican federal labor laws of the 1930s, a famous accomplishment of the revival of the Mexican left under Cárdenas, closely resembled, if they were not actually modeled on, Mussolini's Carta di Lavoro.90

Finally, in the colonies, nationalism meant national independence, and was the call of the people as a whole to arms against the colonial master. The colonial powers recruited natives to staff the lower levels of their administrations, and elements from pre-colonial elites survived, and pursued success in the new order through European education. Some of them found French, British, Dutch, and Unitedstatesean academic mentors-turned-allies to help them transform the progressive metropolitan social ideology into an argument for everything from "native welfare" to national independence. (Furnivall,91 some Dutch adat law sociologists,92 Lambert,93 Tugwell94).

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91 See Furnivall, supra note 42.
2. The Social Allied with Tradition

There was a pattern, identified for the Egyptian case by Amr Shalakany,95 to the process by which a part of the legal elite of one country after another made The Social its own. In case after case, the importing elite found something in the national culture that would make The Social, as opposed to the formalist individualism imputed to CLT, uniquely appropriate to the nation in question.

In Europe, the Catholic South (Portugal, Spain, Italy, along with Hungary) could emphasize that The Social was the philosophy of the Church enunciated in *Rerum Novarum* (1897), which means "of new things," and the "new things" were industrialization, urbanization, interdependence and the rest of The Social. In the 1930s the Vatican struck its infamous deal with fascism, memorialized in the social rhetoric of *Quadrigessimo Anno* (the encyclical of 1937 marking the fortieth anniversary of *Rerum Novarum*). In the Protestant North, the Dutch were able to interpret The Social as particularly appropriate to the interdependent culture of dike-based land reclamation. In Russia, there was the famous peasant village community, or mir.96

In a striking essay published in the *Harvard Law Review* in January 1917,97 Roscoe Pound laid the ills of modern Unitedstatesean society at the door of the "Romanization" of Unitedstatesean law during the second half of the nineteenth century. He presented CLT as an "alien" mode of legal thought, whose formalist individualism had displaced the "organic" common law mode based on the notion of "relation" (husband and wife, master and servant, landlord and tenant). The rediscovery of common law medieval tradition was to be the basis for bringing Unitedstatesean law into harmony with twentieth century conditions of social interdependence. Citations to the German and French civilian originators of the program he proposed were few and far between (though plentiful in his later works,98 representing The Social as the consensus of advanced European legal thought).

In Latin America, the right wing authoritarians appealed to Hispanidad, whose social essence was Catholic but also uniquely American.99 In Mexico, land reform and the ejido system of state-regulated and subsidized cooperative peasant agriculture was supposedly a return to pre-Colombian modes of social organization.100 In Egypt, Sanhouri's eclectic, socially oriented civil code, later adopted or adapted in many other Arab countries, was indigenous and eminently traditional, as well as ultra-modern, because Islamic law was and had

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97 Pound, supra note 7.
98 E.g., Roscoe Pound, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law* (1922).
99 Rock, supra note 89.
always been social.\footnote{Shalakany, \textit{supra} note 93.}

In Africa, there was Senghor's \textit{negritude}, Kenyatta's African idea of property, and Nyerere's African socialism or \textit{Ujaama}.\footnote{Kang'ara, \textit{supra} note 42.} Sun Yat Sen and then Chiang Kai-shek in China developed the nationalist ideology of the Kuomintang, the main opponent of Chinese communism, as a complex and subtle blend of Confucian, "social" and liberal elements.\footnote{Levinson, \textit{supra} note 25.} After World War II, Chiang hired Roscoe Pound as a consultant on the construction of the legal regime of the Republic of China on Taiwan.\footnote{Roscoe Pound, \textit{Progress of the Law in China}, 23 WASH. L. REV. 345, 353 (1948); Roscoe Pound, \textit{The Chinese Civil Code in Action}, 29 TUL. L. REV. 279 (1955).}

The Social could be the public law ideology of a disempowered subgroup in a British colonial structure (the Quebecois in Canada,\footnote{Marie-Claire Belleau, \textit{La Dichotomie Droit Prive/Droit Public Dans le Contexte Québécois et Canadien et L'intersectionnalité Identitaire}, 39 C. DE D. 177 (1998).} or the Afrikaaners in South Africa,\footnote{Andre Van der Waalt, \textit{Tradition on Trial: A Critical Analysis of the Civil-Law Tradition in South African Property Law}, 11 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 169 (1995).} for example) with civilian private law retaining the formalism of the minority's metropole as a symbol of resistance to the common law of the colonial power. In Palestine, jurists influenced by Savigny and Ehrlich developed a secular "Hebrew law" that was first supposed to be individualist and then social, and then went out of fashion, at the moment when the State of Israel began to develop a highly social regime of public law.\footnote{Assaf Likhovski, \textit{The Invention of "Hebrew Law" in Mandatory Palestine}, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 339 (1998).}

Savigny's formalist derivation of all private law from right and will gave way to Savigny's insistence that national legal orders did and should represent the particular normative order of the people involved. But we are left with the question of why, at the moment of discovering national particularity, \textit{each nation discovered the same thing}?

A facile, but initially plausible interpretation would be that The Social was a tool of elites facing precisely the absence of The Social. That is, of elites put in charge of governing territories torn apart by class conflict, or containing wildly heterogeneous tribal, cultural, racial and religious groups, first assembled as colonies according to the interests of the Empires and Great Powers, and then re-parceled at the moment of national independence according to the interests of the Great Powers and of the local elites who were to take their place. The ideology of The Social was (perhaps) not a reflection of national particularity, but an instrument in the "imagining" of presently non-existent national communities.\footnote{ERIC HOBBSWAM, \textit{NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780} (1990); BENEDICT ANDERSON, \textit{IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM} (revised ed. 1991).} This hypothesis gets some support from the story of gender in
3. Sex and Family

In the second globalization, the idea of The Social was dramatically ambiguous when applied to familial and sexual relations. The Social involved the demand that employers treat workers and that merchants treat consumers according to a social ethic, and the rhetoric was one of solidarity and community. The construction of relations of family members as intrinsically altruistic and protective was an obvious reference and support for the demands of workers and consumers. In a sense, the demand was to roll back the nineteenth century disintegration of the household, and reimpose on the capitalist the duties of the patriarch, this time with state enforcement of solidarity, rather than the toleration of arbitrariness. Enemies of The Social never tired of pointing out that it was a "regression" from contract to status, and that it was "demeaning" to the beneficiaries to be treated as though, like the member of the Roman or feudal household, they lacked legal capacity.\(^\text{109}\)

At the same time, The Social stood for modernity, for adapting law to conditions of urbanization, global market economy, technological change, and general interdependence. The progressive social approach to sex and family in the North Atlantic was notably secular, influenced by the first wave of Western feminism, and it in turn influenced the most secular and Westernized segments of the elites of the periphery. Its program was to ease many prohibitions of the nineteenth century gender regime, while at the same time increasing the intrusive enforcement of the duties of the patriarch that CLT had treated as merely moral, as opposed to legal.

The social ideology treated the family as an institution with functions and purposes crucial to the social whole. The family was far from a matter of merely private concern, or something to be left to the particularities of local culture, or an area quarantined as moral rather than legal. Every aspect of family life had, due to social interdependence, far reaching consequences for all other social functions, and the "public interest" therefore justified pervasive intervention against socially pathological behavior. The "study" was a crucial instrument here, as it was in the area of industrial accidents, and the strategy was identical. Revelation of bad conditions of poor families would mobilize the sympathy of the middle class in favor of regulation.

Studies could also support decriminalization and destigmatization by showing that outdated, moralistic controls on sexuality and insistence on the formalities of marriage were socially counterproductive. The public health arguments covered the whole range from child nutrition to venereal disease spread by prostitutes forced into the vice by the combination of poverty and

\(^{109}\) Olsen, Myth of State Intervention, supra note 33; Olsen, The Family and the Market, supra note 34.
repressive social norms ("ruined" women could not marry). The new science of sexology suggested reform in the interest of adult sexual pleasure, but also to stabilize traditional gender arrangements in the interest of society as a whole.110

In the progressive version of The Social, prohibitions were relaxed on non-marital sex, as for example by decriminalizing female adultery and sex between unmarried persons, permitting divorce by mutual consent, legalizing the sale of contraceptives, destigmatizing illegitimacy, and legalizing abortion (so that it would be performed in medically controlled circumstances). The decriminalization of prostitution went along with its regulation in brothels through the typical social mode of an inspectorate armed with criminal penalties and injunctive powers. The social ideology tended to pathologize and medicalize homosexuality.

The duties to be increased included controlling domestic battery both of wives and children, again by establishing administrative agencies armed with low level criminal sanctions and power to initiate the transfer of custody of children. Family and juvenile courts and the newly created profession of "social work" aimed for a deformed legal regime, oriented to welfare rather than rights (best interest of the child, rehabilitation rather than punishment, etc.).111

The progressives' main opponents in the North Atlantic were the Catholic Church and socially conservative Protestant sects (for example, the Bible Belt in the United States, Anglicanism in the United Kingdom). As in the nineteenth century, although the agenda was transnational and the arguments and elements of reform everywhere similar, there was nothing like the globalization of a particular social legal regime. The outcomes varied from country to country and from decade to decade, according to the local balance of forces and the strategies of the contenders. The Social provided, as had CLT, a scheme of categories, arguments and elements for legislation, out which langue national speakers produced the parole of positive law.

The authoritarian nationalist approach was very different, though no less "social." In Nazi Germany, but I think only there, it was relentlessly "modern," eugenecist about reproduction as well as about racial extinction.112 Authoritarians elsewhere were frankly allied with the Catholic or Greek Orthodox Church, both in peripheral Europe and in Latin America, or with Confucian or Shinto "family values" in East Asia. The family played the role of the "heart" or "soul" of the nation exactly because it was traditional rather than modern. The whole nation was a family, for example, and the authoritarian leader was a "father."

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111 CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD (1977).
112 WHEN BIOLOGY BECAME DESTINY: WOMEN IN WEIMAR AND NAZI GERMANY (Renate Bridenthal, et al. eds., 1984).
The interests of the nation required the reform of the family in the interests of society, as in the progressive agenda, but the rhetoric was of protection, rather than of equality. The family agenda was to subsidize the traditional nuclear family and the enterprise of child rearing in order to strengthen the nation against its enemies. This involved reinforcing the power of fathers while increasing services to mothers restricted to the home, pronatalism, and maintaining the system of prohibitions on extra-marital sexuality of women. The main threats for the authoritarian social were "Godless communism" and the "decadent" liberalizing trend in bourgeois humanism and socialism. Homophobia and anti-semitism went hand in hand.113

The national liberation parties in the colonized world faced yet a third configuration. Nationalists were everywhere disputed in their claim to lead the opposition to the colonial power. Of course, in many places there were communist parties. But often more important were political formations representing the fragments that the nationalists hoped to bring together in coalition. In the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa, there were, first of all, Islamic reform parties (and Hindu parties in India). Then there were tribal political organizations (in all the above regions, not just in Africa). And there were racially organized groups, often in reaction against local minorities (for example, against the Chinese or Indians in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, against the Arabs in Subsaharan Africa) that had arrived and prospered under colonial auspices.

The nationalist project was to develop the notion of national particularity as a secular force, against both the colonial power and the fragmenting elements in the local situation. The family played a big role here: the nation could be unified around its unique family values and social values, which provided a clear point of contrast with the imagined sexual and familial degeneracy of the metropole and "the West" in general.114 This made possible a complex set of compromises. First, in the name of modernity, nationalists could endorse education and employment for women, under the regulated conditions that the social program attempted to establish for all workers. Second, women should ideally participate, through state supported organizations, in national struggles as one of the social groups (along with labor, farmers, youth, intellectuals, etc.) making up the corporatist side of the national liberation coalition.

At the same time, the nationalists could compromise in the regulation of gender roles in marriage and extra-marital sexuality with the local forces that identified with tradition. Social rights for labor, land reform, and public/private collaboration in infrastructure development and import substitution industrialization could not just coexist with, they could harmonize with

immobility on formal inequality under Islamic law, toleration of domestic violence and crimes of honor, and the celebration of female virginity before marriage. Activists for women's rights found themselves up against a problem - modernizing secular male elites had chosen to split the difference on issues of sex and the family with the conservative ulama in the Muslim world or the priests in the Catholic world.

Thus the historic compromise of the Code Napoleon (1804) took a new turn. Progressive views about labor law, consumer law, housing law, and so forth, sometimes combined with fascist or traditionalist views about family law and in general about the status of women (in the nineteenth century codes, it had been economic liberalism that combined with family law conservatism). The Social, which could be thoroughly progressive or thoroughly fascist in the political and market domains, could also be progressive or traditionalist on sex and family, and there were always compromises in both domains, and the compromises could go in all directions.

4. The Welfare State

The welfare state figures heavily in the social and political history of the period of The Social, but as I hope is already clear, it would be wrong to treat it as the "essence" or, from the point of view of law, as the central development. The legal concepts that seem most important are those of social insurance (unemployment, accidents, health, and old age pensions) and entitlements based on need, conceptualized as rehabilitative, with an administration that does the need assessment and delivers services (social work) that are supposed to reintegrate the recipient into the presumably normal universe of the labor market.

These are typical manifestations of The Social, with Bismarckian German origins, adopted throughout the capitalist West. There is an easy transition to the notion of social rights, understood as "third generation" (after private law and political rights), occupying a position of juristic ambiguity typical of the innovations of the period. Social rights were both legal, and even constitutional (first in Mexico, 1917), but non-justiciable as to the level of benefits provided, although justiciable as entitlements, once legislatively established within the administrative law regime of the country in question.

Of course, the welfare state could globalize only to a limited extent, because it presupposed a particular kind of economic, social and administrative

117 See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD (1994); EWALD, supra note 56.
development, a measure of political autonomy (i.e., something other than colonial status), and a political configuration. I would characterize the political configuration as one in which a significant measure of redistribution from the middle to the lower-middle and working-class strata, and a significant measure of paternalist control of the spending decisions of those strata (that is, compelling them to insure), could be made plausible, as protection of the social whole, to an electoral majority (for example, the New Deal in the United States, the Front Populaire in France, the corporatist social democracy of Austria) or an authoritarian elite (for example, Germany, Argentina). Note that, as was the case for the liberalization of the law of the household, there developed a single transnational programmatic repertoire and policy vocabulary for social programs (langue), but an infinite diversity of specific national regimes (parole).

5. Land Regimes

The social jurists took a deep interest in the agricultural workers of the South, the very ones that CLT had lumped into the locatio operaia, or freedom of contract regime, blithely ignoring their obvious lack of "free will." This period was the beginning of the population explosion in the South, as death rates in many areas began to fall while birth rates remained constant. The latifundia/minifundia structure began to come apart as the minifundia lost their capacity to absorb population increases, while latifundia, as they became more efficient through mechanization, needed less raw labor power. Up to 1930, capital continued to pour into the developing world, building infrastructure and creating primary product (mineral and agricultural) enterprises and stimulating smallholder cash cropping. After 1930, all of this stopped abruptly. The Southern style of urbanization, based not on the lure of expanding industrial employment, but on the collapse of rural life, got underway.118

This was also the period of Communist revolution in land ownership in Russia, in which both latifundia and minifundia, along with large and small landlord classes, were abolished, and agriculture collectivized. This was an epochal event, transforming the hierarchical structure of the social lives of millions of people, at a very large cost in death and suffering, and relatively little increase in calorie intake per day. Nonetheless, along with failed communist uprisings in places like Germany and Hungary (1919), and China and Indonesia (1927), it caught the attention of elites everywhere.

The challenge for The Social current, after the failure of the Western powers to crush the Russian revolution militarily, was, again, to save liberalism from itself. In this domain, as in that of labor/capital and international conflict, there had to be an alternative to revolution and collectivization. The right wing

118 Wolf, supra note 41.
social solutions (whether in independent authoritarian regimes or in "welfare" oriented colonial ones) were right wing because they neither challenged the owners of latifundia nor tried to force foreign capitalist enterprises to subsidize the poor agricultural sector. Instead, they offered policies like road building, irrigation and extension of power to the countryside. Another right wing trope was resettlement. It might be internal, as in the policy of moving Javanese peasant farmers to the outer islands under the Dutch "Ethical Policy," or into newly acquired territory (for example, Mussolini's North and East African imperial scheme).

The progressive version of The Social adopted the same strategies, but with less tendency to privatize the agents of transformation as soon as possible. Roosevelt's Tennessee Valley Authority is a prime example. But their preoccupation was land reform, in the broadest sense, including the transformation of large into viable small properties, the agglomeration of minifundia into cooperatives, the abolition of tenure forms like sharecropping, and the substitution of various forms of cooperative or state credit for rural moneylenders. Cooperative marketing boards, with delegated state powers as regulated monopsonists, were to cut out the Western commercial intermediaries between cash croppers and international commodity markets. The reformers were far less successful here than elsewhere, and, with exceptions like Mexico, the Depression scuttled most of the schemes that got to the stage of implementation.

6. International Economic Law

The same kind of thinking that led to the rejection of classical liberal law-formalist and individualist led to the rejection of the nineteenth century "gold standard/free trade/private international law" regime. Starting in the 1920s, but exploding after 1929, this is the period of "autarchy" which might better be described as "national strategy" based on bilateral agreements and then on the formation of blocs, first those of the empires and then those based on ideology in the confrontation of liberalism with fascism and communism.

7. Import Substitution Industrialization

The last of the pre-War innovations I will mention began in Latin America. The colonized peripheral countries could not react in their own interests to the Depression; they suffered passively the drying up of investment from their metropoles and the collapse of the prices of their primary product exports. The

120 See generally EICHENGREEN, supra note 19.
last thing their colonial rulers thought of was to open them to the price cutting trade of the Japanese or to encourage them to reduce their imports of metropolitan textiles. But this was not the case for the independent peripheral states.

One of the nineteenth century intellectual origins of The Social was the defense of a protectionist "infant industry" policy by the German school of nazionaloeconomie. Latin American economists who had been passionate fans of the free trade/gold standard approach when it favored rapid development rethought their position and thoroughly modernized nazionaloeconomie as "import substitution industrialization." It became the development strategy of right wing nationalist regimes in Argentina and Brazil. One part was tariffs, manipulated exchange rates, currency controls, import licensing, and subsidized credit, all designed to favor local firms in competition with imports. Another was the development, through classic social law administrative techniques, of a state-owned or heavily state-regulated sector.

D. The Social After World War II

If the Depression and World War II simultaneously stimulated and snuffed out institutional innovations, they made possible, through the sheer intensity of disaster, combined with the defeat of fascism and the containment of communism, a whole collection of institutional triumphs of the progressive version of The Social. The first of these was the creation, for the capitalist core countries, of the nationally and internationally regulated market economy. The second was the globalization of the Bretton Woods system (a "jurisdictional" globalization). The third was the globalization, first from victors to vanquished and then from the first to the third world, of the progressive social reform program of restructuring entitlements as the basis for a highly regulated mixed capitalist economy pursuing a strategy of social peace through economic development.

1. Keynes

If Jhering is the undisputed grandfather of The Social, John Maynard Keynes was perhaps its genius, even though he thought the save-it-from-itself strategy should operate at the state and international levels, leaving the CLT structure of private property and free contract intact. The Bretton Woods system that the Western industrial powers established for their intra-bloc relations during the Cold War eventually became the world financial regulatory system. As initially conceived, it was a typical example of The Social at work.

First of all, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was premised on the idea of the interdependence of financial and currency markets, with the danger being runs on national currencies producing chain reaction downward spirals. The way to stop runs was to "nip them in the bud," from a position outside and
above any single national strategic actor. There was a shared "public interest" in this kind of intervention, so long as it was carefully limited so as not to interfere with national sovereignty in monetary and fiscal policy.

Of course, macroeconomic monetary and fiscal policies were exactly what the CLT model of free trade, gold standard, and private international law were designed to eliminate. Keynes's contribution in this area was to show that fiscal and monetary policy could function rationally as "counter-cyclical," counteracting through strategic action from the center the individualist capitalist logic of boom followed by bust, and so benefiting everyone in the society. But fiscal and monetary policy also meant deficit spending in periods of economic contraction, and, therefore, opened the possibility of financing the whole program of The Social reformers in the very periods when historically they had been forced to close up shop.

2. Globalization of the Bretton Woods System

The Bretton Woods institutions gradually expanded to include the whole non-communist world. Between 1945 and the mid-1960s, decolonization brought into existence a world order of independent "nation" states. The old and new national elites of the periphery were free of direct, that is, jurisdictional, control. And without the gold standard, they were free to manipulate their currencies and national budgets for whatever sovereign purposes. They soon discovered, however, that they needed, for whatever purposes, access to world capital markets. This meant that they had to join the Bretton Woods system - either join this game strictly on the terms proposed, that is, within the structure of legal rules already in place, or starve in the dark.

Within The Social, these trends produced, after World War II, a "third worldist" or Bandung reaction (Nehru, Nasser, Sukarno), and a school of progressive public international law. It deployed the social critique of the individualism of classical private law against the post-World War II supposedly reformed and post-colonial international law regime. The formal liberation and enfranchisement of unfree labor in Europe simply shifted the mechanism of exploitation from the transparency of feudalism to the mystification of capitalism. The formal grant of national independence to colonized peoples likewise shifted the transparency of imperial rule to the mystification of neo-colonialism. In place of the exploitative wage bargain, the modern international order worked through the unequal exchange of primary products from the third world for industrial products from the First. This seems to me to have been the last strictly analytic accomplishment of the social consciousness.

122 Sayed, supra note 88.
3. The Globalization of Regulated Mixed Economy

It seems useful to distinguish two phases here. The first occurred immediately after the War when the Allies forcefully and systematically transformed the Japanese, German, and Italian systems from a fascist to a progressive version of The Social, and imposed a similar transformation on the South Korean and Taiwanese social and economic systems as the price of protection from the Chinese communists. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, land reform was an important part of the transformation, along with at least paper rights for labor unions, at least a paper antitrust regime, and at least paper regulation of the financial system. Germany and Italy were incorporated into the Social Democratic/Christian Democratic model propounded by the progressive social people in the United States, Britain and France (and by German and Italian social democrats before the War).

The second phase was the extension of the import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy across Latin America and to the newly independent third world, first to very large economies such as those of India, Egypt, Turkey, Iran, and Indonesia, and, after 1960, to the very small economies of newly independent African states. The ISI strategy, which relied heavily on public law and government intervention, was strongly supported by the various United Nations bodies, by the World Bank, and by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and it was the initial economic strategy of Taiwan and South Korea (as well as Singapore) before they gradually shifted to export-led growth.¹²⁴ It was a product of Keynesian liberalism as much as of democratic socialism, just as strongly anti-communist as it was against laissez-faire.

ISI typically involved the exploitation of the countryside, supposedly for the sake of industrial capital formation in the cities, through tariffs and through the marketing boards that the social people had pioneered in the 1930s. Aside from South Korea and Taiwan, at the moment of maximum communist threat and maximum liberal influence in Washington, only a very few progressive regimes (for example, Egypt, Bolivia) actually broke up large estates.¹²⁵ The refusal to join the Soviet bloc was more than a matter of diplomacy. Reforming third-world elites adopted the economic institutions of the social current rather than those of communism, and avoided social and economic revolution without having to give up their emoluments.

E. The Critique of The Social

It seems to me hard to overestimate the global transformation of positive law worked by the reformers in The Social current. Again, what was globalized was not any particular social regime, and the rate of socialization varied from country to country and within each country from decade to decade. There was no single end point toward which national regimes of positive law converged, and if, as I will suggest in a moment, we take the year 1968 as a rough marker for the demise of The Social as dominant legal consciousness, we would have to say that it had triumphed institutionally, but in as many forms as there were sovereigns. In other words, as parole rather than as structure.

The critique of The Social was a cumulative phenomenon, beginning in the 1930s with the second wave of legislative reforms (the first occurred during the decade before World War I), and developing continuously along with the gradual adoption of social law over time and around the world. There was only a brief period, broadly denominated "the fifties," during which The Social had no strong opponent (CLT was discredited and Marxism, in the West, disintegrated).

The critiques that reached critical mass by 1968 were, theoretically, politically and programmatically contradictory. The Social at which they were directed was institutionalized, a thoroughly entrenched status quo implemented at the level of legal doctrine by a cadre of jurists who had never known anything but the social superimposed on CLT. They were administrators rather than reformers or intellectuals, and most of them ignored the critiques they happened to notice. The situation is not that different to this very day, except that the people of The Social now lament the puzzling "resurgence" of CLT after 1980. By contrast, the brilliant avant-gardist early social people directed a relatively unitary "individualism plus abuse of deduction" critique at CLT at the moment when a relatively unitary social program of law reform was emerging transnationally as a potent threat to the established order.

The first two critiques originated in the 1930s. One was the critique of the is-to-ought move deriving reform legislation from the science of society. The two main sources of the critique of is-to-ought were Max Weber126 and the logical positivists.127 Weber influenced European jurists like Hans Kelsen (according to whom sociological jurisprudence was nothing but a disguised

127 E.g., A.J. AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC (1936). As applied in law, the logical positivist critique went far beyond Weber, advocating a purely descriptive legal science that would formulate its hypotheses without using suspect mentalist categories like "legal validity." There was a self-conscious parallel with behaviorism in psychology (getting rid of everything mental, leaving only stimulus and response) and the move to "revealed preference" (getting rid of "utility" and "choice") in economics. See generally JACK SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995).
vehicle for "natural law tendencies"), and Unitedstateseans like Karl Llewellyn. After the War, Unitedstatesean pragmatism, in its philosophical version, turned decisively against the is-to-ought version of its founders, leaving behind the more Deweyan jurists of, for example, the Legal Process school.

The critique of is-to-ought included a move similar to the abuse-of-deduction critique of CLT. This was that the social people were able to maintain the illusion that they were deriving legal rules from social needs or functions or purposes only by ignoring the pervasive phenomenon of conflict between desiderata - thereby producing something aptly named "social conceptualism." This first critique is the intellectual ancestor of modern policy analysis.

A second, conservative and neo-liberal, critique was of the association of The Social with fascism and communism. There are many paradoxes here. First, there was a strong Marxist critique of The Social as mere band-aid, and at the same time some quite striking incorporations of it into the parts of Soviet legal ideology that seem today the least "communist." The social people included the dominant anti-communist and anti-fascist intellectual currents of the inter-War period, with the agenda, as I mentioned above, of saving liberalism from itself. And in the post-World War II period in which the social jurists gradually faded from view, the conservatives who treated them as tainted rested their case against communism on the post-1945 success of the 1930's reform institutions, pushed through by The Social people over conservative objections.

The remaining critiques developed during the 1960s and 1970s. They have a complex internal relationship to one another, which I would describe as follows. The dominant rhetoric of critique was civil libertarian, and permitted a de facto alliance of left and right, quite similar to that which had linked the social democratic and fascist versions of The Social now under attack. The critique targeted the procedural dimension of the social reform program, that is, its anti-formalism. In family law, criminal law, labor law, public housing, the law of civil commitment, and in the law of prisons, mental hospitals, and juvenile homes, the social program involved the creation of new institutions.

130 See generally, MIKHAL ALBERSTEIN, PRAGMATISM AND LAW: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2002).
131 Llewellyn, supra note 129; Klare, supra note 69.
132 FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
133 GERARD FARJAT, LE DROIT ÉCONOMIQUE (1971).
These were deliberately constructed to empower administrators operating on the basis of expertise, under broad standards in the public interest and in the interests of clients lacking full capacity.

The civil libertarians attacked the institutions as denying individual rights and their administrators as arbitrary and implicitly authoritarian manipulators: the standards were vacuous and the expertise claim was empty. At one level, the demand was for procedural rights, for example, to hearings applying rationally intelligible decision criteria with judicial review, before the administrators did things to their charges. But behind this demand there was a seismic cultural and political shift, occurring more or less simultaneously all over the developed West.

At the political level, the context for the jurists' critique of The Social included the discrediting of the socially oriented leadership of the United States Vietnam War ("the best and the brightest") with perhaps 2,000,000 deaths, the discrediting of the Soviet alternative in Prague Spring and Afghanistan, the gradual discrediting of third world revolutionary national liberation ideology in China (the Great Leap Forward, the Red Guards), Ghana and Algeria.

The slaughter of 500,000 communists and sympathizers by the army and Islamists in Indonesia as American-backed Suharto replaced Sukarno in the economic chaos of a failed ISI strategy, and of 1 million ordinary people by the communist Pol Pot regime in Cambodia after the United States "destabilized" the country, the descent of one Arab or African state after another from ISI into kleptocracy - none of it was "the fault" of The Social, not at all. The "good" social people hated all of this. And yet, a whole "regime" was discredited, expertise was discredited, and so on indefinitely.

The non-communist left rebellion against The Social was cultural and intellectual as much as political. Behind the civil libertarians were writers like Ken Kesey, Jean Genet and Betty Friedan, who recast the supposedly benign social institutions as forms of hell analogous to the hells of the period's public sphere, and post-structuralist theorists of the social as "discipline," in the wake of Michel Foucault. As Donzelot argued, the New Left around the world, when it was not Marxist-Leninist, was a utopian rebellion against The Social, and failed because the masses on whom it called had been transformed by The Social into the strongest supporters of the status quo. The striking thing about the end of The Social on the left is that what replaced it had no relation to this rebellious or utopian/anarchic strand. It was rather a revival of faith in

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139 Donzelot, supra note 56.
rights, this time human rather than individual or social, in legal formality in place of the standards of The Social, and in the judiciary as a non-political, non-murderous defense against the military-industrial-welfare-administrative state that The Social seemed to have become.

On the right, there was a two-strand attack. Social conservatives like Christopher Lasch attacked the social institutions for undermining, through social engineering and bureaucratic service provision, the very social bonds they had claimed to be preserving. And emerging slowly from 1968 on, there was the neo-liberal charge that the social program had perverse economic consequences as well as perverse social ones: it was bad for economic growth, it required the middle classes to subsidize the lower classes, and it hurt the people it was trying to help by forcing them to buy social protections of various kinds that were worth less to them than they cost in increased pricing (as summarized in the slogan "non-disclaimable tenants' protections force landlords to raise the rent and evict the grandmother").

"The Sixties" involved something less distinct and final than the discrediting of CLT by the events of the period from the beginning of World War I to the Depression and the rise of fascism and communism. But I don't think it mere generational prejudice (b. 1942) to see the period, in neo-Hegelian organicist terms, as the moment when the chrysalis disintegrated around the legal consciousness we call contemporary.

III. The Third Globalization

In this section, I summarize my as yet quite tentative thoughts about how the analysis above might be extended to include a third globalization. Although it is easy to see the first and second globalizations as thesis and antithesis, the third globalization cannot be seen as, does not see itself as, a synthesis. The third globalization resembles the first two in that it is founded on a brutal critique of its predecessor, in this case, The Social. But it differs from both CLT and The Social in the respect that there is no discernible large integrating concept, parallel to the will theory or the notion of adaptation to interdependence, mediating between normative projects and subsystems of positive law. Rather I would describe the structure of the consciousness globalized after 1945 as the unsynthesized coexistence of transformed elements of CLT with transformed elements of The Social. Of course, this failure on my part to "totalize" may mean only that, because dusk has not yet fallen on "modernity," my pet owl Minerva has not been able to take flight.

The key transformed element of CLT is thinking in the mode of deduction within a system of positive law presupposed to be coherent, or "ne-o-

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140 Lasch, supra note 111.
formalism." Neo-formalism runs wild in, but also is mainly confined to, public law, including international, constitutional and criminal law (not administrative law), and family law. It can be right or left. By contrast, CLT legal science was that of the law of obligations.

The key transformed element of The Social is policy analysis, but based on "conflicting considerations" (also called balancing or proportionality). It produces rules that are ad hoc compromises, rather than the social rules dictated by single social purposes in coherently adaptive new legal regimes. This mode can also be right or left, and is present everywhere, sometimes therefore, surprisingly, coexisting with neo-formalism.

Between 1850 and 1950 (more or less), the plurality of schools of legal philosophy did not produce a diversity of modes of legal imagination, argument, and law-making. Until around 1900, everyone ended up with a version of the will theory, and after 1900 everyone ended up either with a version of the will theory or with a version of The Social. Today, all over the world, positive legal regimes in every area of law are those that emerged from the confrontation at the level of legislation or case law between CLT and The Social, understood as law reform projects rather than as legal consciousnesses. There is a substratum of positively enacted classical contract law everywhere, and a superstructure of positively enacted social labor law. There are multiple administrative agencies dealing with a host of socially problematic areas, everywhere; and everywhere there is the law of the free market (itself more or less internally "socialized") governing beneath and between and among the regulatory regimes.

What there is not is a new way of conceiving the legal organization of society, a new conception at the same level of abstraction as CLT or The Social. Institutional innovation goes on constantly (for example, structural adjustment, the European Commission (E.C.), securitization). But each new piece of positive law presents itself as parole, dissolvable into the expanded legal langue that now includes, as interchangeable elements, all the innovative concepts of The Social along with, rather than in place of, those of CLT.

On the field of positive law, structured and unstructured in a way that represents not any single logic, but rather the contingent outcomes of hundreds of confrontations of The Social with CLT, it is still possible to argue as a classical person. One simply starts from and pursues the premise that the law is or should be the coherent working out of the coherent idea of individual freedom so far as compatible with the like freedom of others. In the law of market (see below for sex and the family), this mode of argument now identifies one as a neo-liberal or libertarian or free market conservative. CLT in its pure form is now a right wing project rather than a legal consciousness.

It is also still possible to argue as though there were an obvious logic of social development, denied by CLT, that does or should animate all of positive law. Whereas up to World War II this might identify one as a fascist as
probably as a progressive, the left-over Social is now, in the law of the market, almost always a progressive stance. Like CLT, The Social in market law has lost its political indeterminacy, but ended up on the left rather than on the right. CLT and The Social, in these left-over, politicized forms, are not so much discredited as dated, or "old hat," or tired ways of proceeding, sporadically forceful, more often merely ritual.

These valences are reversed in the law of sex and the family. There, CLT is left or liberal feminist or libertarian, with equal rights still a program for transformation of the relations between men and women and for the liberation of "sexual minorities." The Social, in sharp contrast, is conservative, traditionalist or authoritarian in sex and family law, just the opposite of its valence in market law. The pre-War traditionalist or authoritarian element in The Social survives here as Asian or Islamic or official Catholic or fundamentalist Christian values, opposed to the "decadence" of Western sexual and familial rule and mores.

Policy analysis, the first of the great innovations of post-War legal thought, deals with the ongoing management of pre-existing legal regimes conceived as compromises between "individualist" (CLT) and social desiderata. Public law neo-formalism, the second great innovation, is a disruptive, rather than managerial mode, brought to bear sometimes on the institutions that embodied The Social, and sometimes on the institutions that embodied CLT. It appeals, beyond the settlement between CLT and The Social represented by the institution in question, to supposedly transcendent, but also positively enacted values in constitutions or treaties, against the status quo.

In place of the unselfconscious confidence in reason and science of CLT, and of the combative self-assertion of The Social, policy analysis has been, for fifty years, the vehicle of modest, workmanlike devotion to doing legal work with whatever materials are left over from the grandiose projects of the past. Its practitioners are most proud when their conclusions are warranted non-political because they please and displease left and right without apparent pattern.

Public law neo-formalism rebels in the name of "absolutes" outraged in a particular context. Neo-formalism is unreflective in a way diametrically opposite to policy analysis. The argument that the closed shop violates the Mexican Constitution's guarantee of freedom of association, or that the failure to criminalize clitoridectomy violates the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), or that affirmative action policies in university admissions violate equal protection, or that any judge in any country might authorize the detention of Pinochet for human rights abuses in violation of international law - all presuppose either a mystical union of natural and positive law, or the mode of deduction from abstractions effectively trashed by the early theorists of The Social.
In place of the professor of CLT and the legislator/administrator of The Social, the hero figure of the third globalization is unmistakably the judge, who brings either policy analysis or neo-formalism to bear, as best s/he can, on disputes formulated by governmental and non-governmental organizations claiming to represent civil society.

Contemporary legal consciousness organizes these claimants according to their plural, cross-cutting "identities." Identity represents at once an extension of and a total transformation of the categories - social class and ethnicity - through which the social jurists disintegrated the Savignian "people." Contemporary identities cross cut in the sense that each of us has many. One person can be a straight white male married ruling class New England Protestant Unitedstatesean nerd, not living with a disability, not a person living with AIDS, not a survivor (that he remembers) of childhood sexual abuse, etc.

My example is awkward because, in contemporary global legal consciousness, the notion of identity is the descendant of the social preoccupation not with dominant but with subordinated or discriminated or persecuted identities. Identity is typically the basis of a claim against the "majority" or "dominant culture." Identity thinking alternates between essentializing what it is to have some particular trait that sets its possessors apart, in order to develop and legitimate legal claims, and trying to reconcile those claims when they conflict. Of course, straightforward nationalist claims, and claims based on class or minority ethnic oppression are no less common today than they were in the inter-war period. It is just that they are no longer paradigmatic.

The centrality of the judge, combined with the problematic status of juristic method in the aftermath of critiques, and the multiplication of claimant identities, poses a new problem. In place of the question of the extent to which law should be moral, for CLT, and the question of the relation between law and society, for the Social, in contemporary legal consciousness the question is the relationship between law and politics. The judge simultaneously represents law against legislative politics domestically and sovereign politics internationally, and must answer the charge that s/he is a usurper, doing "politics by other means."

Contemporary legal consciousness harbors a plethora of normative reconstruction projects, designed to transcend the opposition of CLT and The Social, and thereby restore Reason to rulership in law. In place of, or along side, the normative projects of CLT and the Social - utilitarianism, natural rights, social Darwinism, Catholic natural law, Marxism, pragmatism, Comteanism, and so on - we have Legal Process, liberal rights theory (often puzzlingly combined with analytical jurisprudence), efficiency analysis, republicanism, communitarianism, legal neo-pragmatism, feminist legal theory,

143 See López-Medina, supra note 2.
critical race theory. And that is just the Unitedstatesean array. There is no more a dominant reconstruction project today than there was a dominant philosophy of law in the late nineteenth century or between the World Wars.

Contemporary legal consciousness also harbors a plethora of methodologies through which legal theorists attempt to achieve a distanced understanding of the relation of law to other domains. These include analytical jurisprudence, the sociology of law, the economic analysis of law, literary theorizing of law as text, the cultural study of law, critical legal studies, postmodern legal theory. Of course, the interpretive modes are no less value-saturated for having eschewed prescription. Critical legal studies, the approach of this article, includes a critique of policy analysis, for its pretension to leach out, through the notion of universalizability, the inevitable particularism of political/legal choice. And it includes a critique of public law neo-formalism for suppressing the moment of "governance" in political/legal choice.144

IV. CONCLUSION

The left and right political ideologies pursued through contemporary legal consciousness are no more internally coherent than the legal dogmatics of CLT or the organicist dogmatics of the Social. This point is an important antidote to the tendency to see a discussion of the politics of law, like the one above, as reducing law to politics. As I have argued at length elsewhere, the reduction is impossible because, for example, the projects of the right oscillate between libertarianism and social conservatism; those of the left, say for sex and family law issues, between a feminist identity politics of protection and a queer theoretical anti-identity politics of sexual liberation.145

In other words, the content of left and right projects is no more reliably "axiologically decidable" (or "determinate," as we used to say in critical legal studies) than the pure question of legal validity. When one traces the phenomenology of decision under uncertainty into the choice of an interpretation of one's own politics, it turns out that there is an "hermeneutic circle." Commitments as an actor within a legal consciousness shape politics as well as the reverse.146

Even in Clausewitz's famous formulation,147 war is politics by other means, not "just" politics. In Carl Schmitt's flip of Clausewitz, politics is war by other

145 Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM, LEFT CRITIQUE, supra note 144.
146 KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION, supra note 1 at 187-91.
147 CARL VON Clausewitz, ON WAR (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1832).
means, but not reducible to war. War as "means" can be an end, or a means to other ends than politics. If law is politics, it is so, again, by other means, and there is much to be said, non-reductively, about those means. By analogy with Schmitt, it seems to me also true that politics is law by other means, in the sense that politics flows as much from the unattainable demand for ethical rationality in the world as from the economic interests or pure power lust with which it is so often discursively associated.

The narrative begun in this article attempts to historicize "our" situation, in the mode of left critical theory combined with modernism/postmodernism. The three globalizations are incidents in the story of military force, economic power, and ideological hegemony within the capitalist period of world history. I understand this period not as playing out the logic of capital, but rather as the period of universal rationalization paradoxically intertwined with the death of reason. The death of reason permits (but does not require or in itself bring about) the taking back of alienated powers that can be used for local or national or transnational change toward equality, community, and wild risky play. But they are powers whose ethical exercise start from accepting the existential dilemmas of undecidability that legal discourse has, from globalization to globalization, staunchly denied.

150 Id.